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The control of Polish courts over the infringements of procedural rules 
by the national competition authority.
Case comment to the judgement of the Supreme Court 
of 19 August 2009 – Marquard Media Polska 
(Ref. No. III SK 5/09)1
Facts
The President of the Office of Competition and Consumers Protection (hereafter, 
UOKiK) issued a decision on 2 June 2006 (RKT-35/2006) finding that Marquard Media 
Polska has abused its dominant position (breach of Article 8(2)(1), (5) and 7 of the 
Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumers Protection2) by imposing 
unfair prices, counteracting the formation of conditions necessary for the emergence 
or development of competition and market sharing. Marquard Media was ordered to 
refrain from the said conduct and fined 1.972.600 złoty (approx. 500.000 euro).
Marquard Media appealed the UOKiK decision to the Court of Competition and 
Consumers Protection (hereafter, SOKiK) as the court of first instance and then again 
appealed the SOKiK judgement3 to the Court of Appeals in Warsaw. In its appeal, 
Marquard Media claimed that the UOKiK President has committed a number of alleged 
breaches of procedural rules. The plaintiff argued that these procedural violations should 
be controlled by the court and result in the revocation of the UOKiK decision. The appeal 
claimed: (1) the lack of verification of the correctness of the antitrust proceedings by SOKiK 
in a situation where the court bases its judgment exclusively on the evidence collected 
during these proceedings; (2) non-annulment of the UOKiK decision despite it being 
imprecise; (3) arbitrary evidence assessment by SOKiK especially when it comes to the 
evidence collected by UOKiK and the evidence presented by Marquard Media in juridical 
proceedings. The plaintiff argued also that in a situation where new evidence presented in 
1 The case comment is limited to the procedural issues of the judgment. For the question 
whether selective, above-cost price cutting in the newspaper market shall be qualified as an 
anticompetitive exclusion see below the case comment by Konrad Kohutek. 
2  Journal of Laws 2005 No. 244, item 2080. The same forms of abuses are also listed under 
the new Act of 16 July 2007 on Competition and Consumers Protection (Journal of Laws 
2007 No. 50, item 337; hereinafter, Competition Act); see Article 9(2)(5) and Article 7 of 
Competition Act. 
3  The judgment of 24 July 2007, No. XVII Ama 48/06, not reported. Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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court cannot remedy all of the procedural irregularities of the administrative proceedings, 
the UOKiK decision shall be quashed (annulled4) by the court. Marquard Media argued 
also that the court should scrutinize all of the alleged procedural irregularities and thus 
exercise full control over the administrative proceedings. Despite the arguments raised 
by the plaintiff, both SOKiK and the Court of Appeals in Warsaw upheld the UOKiK 
decision dismissing all of its procedural objections5. In consequence, Marquard Media 
filed a cassation request to the Supreme Court quoting the aforementioned procedural 
arguments (concerning especially the extent of control exercised by the Courts over the 
UOKiK proceedings). In its judgment, the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of the Court 
of Appeals and remanded the case for re-examination.
The Supreme Court judgement
The Supreme Court dismissed most of the procedural objections raised by 
Marquard Media. Accepted was only the argument that procedural provisions were 
violated when it comes to the wrongful formulation of the conclusion of the original 
decision and when it comes to the lack of proper justification of the imposition of 
the rigor of its execution.
The judgment of the Supreme Court on the crucial procedural issues was not 
in favor of the plaintiff. The judges described first the position and the role of 
SOKiK. According to the Court, the task of SOKiK is to decide on the merits of 
a dispute between the UOKiK President and the appealing undertaking in order to 
establish if the provisions of the Competition Act were breached, to legally qualify 
the infringement and to decide on sanctions. SOKiK shall asses the arguments and 
evidence presented by the parties and decide, whether the measures applied by the 
UOKiK President were legal and proportional. However, the Supreme Court did 
not specify which administrative measures shall be assessed. Taking into account its 
further statements, it seems that those undertaken by the UOKiK President during 
the proceedings (such as inspections) are not included. In its judgement, SOKiK is 
entitled both to change the original decision and to quash it. For that reason, it should 
not limit itself to finding the defectiveness of a UOKiK decision. Instead, it should 
repair (‘heal’) the irregularities of the administrative decision as long as that is possible 
in the circumstances of the case and the evidence collected.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, UOKiK decisions can be quashed only 
exceptionally when their irregularities cannot be repaired in the given case. The 
Supreme Court stated therefore that SOKiK is not obliged to refer in detail to the 
procedural objections raised in the appeal especially, if the submitted irregularities 
are not likely to be of a kind that influences the UOKiK decision on its merits.
4 Article  47931a § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that if the appeal is accepted, the 
UOKiK decision can be changed or quashed (revoked) by SOKiK whereby the revocation has 
the same effect as an annulment.
5  The judgment of 24 July 2008, VI ACa 12/08, UOKiK Offcial Journal 2008 No. 4, item 41.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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The Supreme Court specified further that procedural irregularities concerning evidence 
(it did not specify however how it understands the notion of evidence) should not lead 
to the revocation of a UOKiK decision provided, that it is in line with the provisions of 
substantial law. The Court accepted that evidence collected in administrative proceedings 
can be used in court but that evidence collected by the UOKiK President in violation of 
the law should be disregard by SOKiK. Moreover, the revocation of a UOKiK decision is 
possible only if it was delivered without proper legal basis, in violation of substantial law 
provision, if it was addressed to an entity that was not a party to the original proceedings 
or, when the issue had already been decided in another decision. Annulment can also take 
place in a situation when there is a need to determine (in administrative proceedings) all 
issues indispensable to decide on the case. 
The Supreme Court rejected the opinion of Marquard Media that the UOKiK 
proceedings were out of any judicial control. The judges stated that any objections 
against the proceedings and decision of the UOKiK President, provided that they are 
admissible and well-founded, can result firstly in the change of the original decision 
and secondly, in its revocation.
The notion of ‘full jurisdiction’ under Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) states 
that decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not satisfy the requirements 
of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Convention (the 
Convention)6 must be subject to subsequent control by a ‘judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction’ over questions of facts and law7. Full jurisdiction means that the court 
should be entitled, and actually examine, all the relevant facts8 as well as have the 
power to quash the administrative decision9 in all its aspects (facts and law). When 
it comes to the assessment of their legality, the ECtHR expects the judiciary to not 
be limited to assess whether the impugned decision is compatible with substantive 
6  Under Article 6(1) of the Convention in the determination of civil rights and obligations 
or of any criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.
7  Generally see judgments: Albert and Le Compte v Belgium of 10 February 1983, no. 7299/75, 
7496/76, para. 29; Gautrin and others v France of 20 May 1998, no. 21257/93, para. 57; Frankowicz 
v Poland of 16 December 2008, no. 53025/99, para. 60. Specifically for judicial control over 
administrative bodies see judgments: Bendenoun v France of 24 February 2004, no. 12547/86, 
para. 46; Umlauft v Austria of 23 October 1995, no. 15527/89, para. 37–39; Schmautzer v Austria 
of 23 October 1995, no. 15523/89, para. 34; Janosevic v Sweden of 21 May 2003, no. 34619/97, 
para. 81. See also L. Drabek, ‘A Fair Hearing Before EC Institutions’ (2001) 4 European Review 
of Private Law 561; K. Lenaerts, J. Vanhamme, ‘Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the 
Community Administrative Process’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 561–562.
8  Schmautzer v Austria, para. 35.
9  Schmautzer v Austria, para. 36; Janosevic v Sweden, para. 81Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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law10. Courts shall also be empowered to set aside an administrative decision in its 
entirety or in part, if it is established that procedural requirements of fairness were 
not met in the proceedings which led to its adoption11. 
EU law generally accepts this approach. European courts pointed out that the 
decision of the Commission shall be subject to judicial control not only from the point 
of view of its legality but also when it comes to the correctness and importance of the 
facts established by the Commission12. Traditionally however, European courts focus 
on whether the Commission has infringed essential procedural requirements – if a 
violation is established, the decision of the Commission is annulled. This happened, for 
example, when the Commission relied on the interpretation of a number of documents 
upon which parties had no chance to comment on13; when the Commission failed to 
properly explain charges contained in a statement of objections14; or where its decision 
lacked proper justification15.
The assessment of the Supreme Court’s judgement
The judgment of the Supreme Court raises serious doubts from the point of view 
of the requirements of ‘full jurisdiction’. It seems in particular that SOKiK does not 
exercise full jurisdiction with respect to procedural infringements over the proceedings 
before and the decisions of the UOKiK President. 
The judgment confirmed that SOKiK is a first instant court the role of which is not 
limited to the assessment of the legality of the appealed decision16 but rather, to decide 
the case on its merits17. This realisation is certainly true. One has to disagree however with 
the opinion of the Supreme Court that in consequence, SOKiK shall not concentrate on 
10 ECtHR judgment in case Potocka and others v Poland of 4 October 2001, no. 33776/96, 
para. 55, 58.
11 Ibidem.
12 CFI judgment of 11 March 1999 in case T-156/94 Siderugica Aristrain Madrid SL v 
Comission [1999] ECR II-645, para. 115. See also A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement 
and Human Rights, Cheltenham, Northampton 2008, p. 152.
13 CFI judgment of 29 June 1995 in case T-30/91 Solvay v Comission [1995] ECR II-1775, 
para. 81.
14 Judgment of the Court of 23 October 1974 in case 17/74 Transocean v Comission [1974] 
ECR 01063, para. 13-20; judgement of the Court of First Instance of 30 September 2003 in 
case T-191/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and others v Comission [2003] ECR II-3275, para. 
113 i 162.
15 CFI judgment of 22 September 2005 in case T-101/03 Suproco NV v Comission [2005] 
ECR II-3839, para. 20.
16  See also the Supreme Court judgment of 13 May 2004, III SK 44/04 (2005) 9 OSNP, item 
136 and the Supreme Court judgment of 20 September 2005, No. III SZP 2/05 (2006) 19–20 
OSNP 2006, item 312.
17 See also Supreme Court judgment of 18 September 2003, No. I CK 81/02, LEX no. 
359427 and the Court of Appeal in Warsaw judgment of 20 December 2006, VI ACa 620/06, 
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the possible infringements of procedural rules18. The Polish ‘hybrid’ procedure19 whereby 
SOKiK is dealing with the case ab initio and is formally considered as the first instance 
court, cannot mean that full judicial control over administrative proceedings does not exist 
in practice. The Supreme Court seems instead to accept such a situation stating directly 
that SOKiK is not obliged to refer in its judgment to the procedural objections raised by 
the plaintiff against the UOKiK proceedings. As a result, control over possible procedural 
infringements is becoming an exception rather than a rule. This would be acceptable only 
if UOKiK proceedings and decisions were not to have any importance for the judicial 
proceedings. In practice however, they are of great importance.
The Supreme Court was right stating that not every procedural error committed 
by the UOKiK President should lead to its decision being quashed. It is also correct 
to say that SOKiK should repair, if possible, such errors especially by introducing and 
hearing new evidence. If an undertaking claims, for example, that a witness was heard 
during the administrative proceedings in violation of procedural requirements, SOKiK 
can disqualify such evidence and hear the witness again. This means however, that 
SOKiK has to first check if such requirements were actually followed.
However, the Supreme Court noted that there are some procedural errors that 
cannot be ‘healed’ by the judiciary. It must be argued that a UOKiK decision should 
indeed be quashed if it infringes essential procedural requirements. Generally 
speaking, this should refer to a situation when the values of procedural fairness were 
not respected before the UOKiK President. The violation of the right to be heard, 
right to defence or right to privacy during administrative proceedings must be seen 
as a reason for annulling a decision in its entirety. In cases of such violations, the 
possibility of SOKiK to disqualify the evidence collected in breach of these rights 
cannot be seen as a sufficient guarantee especially because SOKiK does not scrutinize 
UOKiK proceedings from their procedural point of view.
It must also be borne in mind in this context that a predominant part of the evidence 
upon which SOKiK’s judgments are based is collected during the administrative 
proceedings. It is clear that the court, as opposed to the UOKiK President, is not entitled 
to inspect the premises of an undertaking or send an information requests to other 
market participants. Breaches with respect of procedural rules of substantial character, 
such as the violation of the privilege against self incrimination or a disproportional 
character of inspection when it comes to the violation of privacy, should thus result in 
the annulment of the decision. It seems however, in the view of the judgment of the 
Supreme Court, that it is not possible for SOKiK to quash the decision in such situations20 
because procedural irregularities concerning evidence do not lead to the revocation of 
the decision, provided it is in line with the provisions of substantial law.
18 In this respect see also SOKiK judgments of 24 July 2007, No. XVII Ama 84/06, not 
reported and of 22 June 2005, No. XVII Ama 55/04, UOKiK Official Journal 2005 No. 3, item 42.
19  See in details: Z. Kmieciak, ‘Postępowanie w sprawach konkurencji a koncepcja procedury 
hybrydowej’ [‘Proceeding in competition cases and a concept of hybryd procedure’] (2002) 4 
Państwo i Prawo 31-47.
20  This is the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw – see the judgment of 17 June 2008, 
VI Aca 1162/07, not reported.Vol. 2010, 3(3)
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The judgement of the Supreme Court lacks clarity when it comes to the statement that 
SOKiK is not obliged to refer in detail to the procedural objections raised in the appeal 
especially, when it is not proven that the irregularities are of a kind that influences the 
decision on its merits21. Moreover, the word ‘especially’ suggests that SOKiK is not obliged 
to refer to such objections also in other situations. It seems however, that according to 
the Supreme Court, when the undertaking has not proven that the irregularities influence 
the UOKiK decision on its merits, they are outside of judicial control22. One cannot 
agree with this approach – infringements of procedural fairness should be examined by 
the courts per se irrespective of their influence on the final outcome23. Thus a breach of 
the right to be heard, for instance by denying access to certain pieces of evidence, should 
result in the revocation of the decision even if the undertaking has not enough arguments 
to discredit the evidence it was not given access to.
The list of situations when the decisions can be quashed is to narrow as it is lacking 
direct indication of substantial breaches of procedural requirements. When opportunity 
presents itself in the future, the Supreme Court should clarify its approach in order 
to allow the revocation of administrative decisions in cases of serious procedural 
infringements (1) even if it is not proven that the violations have a direct effect on the 
outcome of the decision, (2) even if the decision is in accordance with the provisions 
of substantive law and (3) also with respect to breaches in matters of evidence. The 
Supreme Court should also stress that SOKiK has to pay attention to the objections 
of procedural character raised by the undertakings.
When it comes to the violation of procedural rules concerning evidence, SOKiK 
should disregard such evidence and, in cases where not enough evidence is left to 
prove a violation of the Competition Act, it should change the UOKiK decision by not 
establishing an infringement. Such an approach seems to be in accordance with the 
commented Supreme Court judgment. SOKiK should be ready to quash an UOKiK 
decision in cases when it is established that the undertaking was deprived of the 
opportunity to defend itself during the administrative proceedings (per analogiam 
Article 379(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure), that is, in a situation of a violation of 
a requirement that is indispensable for the validity of proceedings24.
Maciej Bernatt
PhD candidate at the Jean Monnet Chair on European Economic Law, 
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21  SOKiK judgment of 20 February 2007, XVII Ama 95/05, not reported.
22  This opinion was expressed directly in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw 
of 24 July 2008, VI ACa 12/08. See also the Supreme Court decision of 29 April 2009, III SK 
8/09, not reported.
23  Compare: R. Summers, ‘Evaluating and Improving Legal Process – A Plea for “Process 
Values” (1974) 60(1) Cornell Law Review 11–14.
24  Supreme Court in the ruling of 29 April 2009, III SK 8/09, suggested that the violation of 
the requirements that are indispensable for the validity of the proceedings can be the ground 
for the revocation of the UOKiK President decision.